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RECENT TRENDS IN CHOICE-OF-LAW
METHODOLOGY*
Arthur Taylor von Mehrent
INTRODUCTION
The connections between choice of law and comparative law
are pervasive. Every choice-of-law problem potentially involves a
comparative law problem, that of understanding and applying a
rule or principle derived from another legal order. Choice-of-law
methodologies also trench on comparative law. It is clear, for
example, that a Bealean approach does not avoid-though it tends
to conceal-the comparative law problem. Beale's choice-of-law
methodology is based, in significant measure, on the inarticulate
premise that considerable diversity in rules and principles need
not-and usually does not-mean that the legal orders involved
hold fundamentally different or conflicting views respecting the
basic policies relevant to regulation of the matter at issue. Charac-
terization, a procedure basic to the Bealean method, proceeds on
the assumption that the doctrinal structures of the implicated legal
orders are uniform. Where this is clearly not so, as, for example,
where a French court must face a trust problem, characterization
can only proceed on the basis of an explicit comparative law
analysis.
Latter-day disenchantment with Beale and the first Conflicts
Restatement has, on the whole, made the comparative dimension in
choice-of-law methodology both more explicit and more important.
Full development of the implications of the- approach that began
with Cook and Cavers requires a sensitive understanding for each
case of the function of the potentially applicable domestic-law rules
and principles of the various concerned legal orders. Currie's
insistence on applying the forum's rule whenever the forum state
has an interest in applying its policy may be more an unwillingness
to become involved with comparative law problems than a neces-
sary conclusion from the premises underlying his formal analysis.
Much of the discussion in this article of recent trends in
* This article is a revised version of Une esquisse de M'volution du droit international priv
aux Etats-Unis, 100 JOURNAL Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 116 (1973) and is published with the
permission of that journal.
t Professor, Harvard Law School. B.S. 1942, LLB. 1945, Ph.D. 1946, Harvard Univer-
sity.
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American choice-of-law methodology suggests the growing sig-
nificance of the comparative law dimension in the handling of
choice-of-law issues. Accordingly, although its theme is not
explicitly comparative, this article can fairly claim a place in the
Cornell Law Review's issue honoring a friend of long standing,
Professor Rudolf Schlesinger, distinguished scholar and teacher in
the field of comparative law.'
Choice of law is doubtless the most elusive and difficult branch
of private international law. Adjudicatory jurisdiction and recogni-
tion of judgments present difficulties and complexities,' but often
these yield to analysis and reflection more readily and completely
than do those encountered in choice of law. This article examines
the reasons for the intractability of the choice-of-law problem and
addresses the question whether American theory and practice in
the last several decades have illuminated the field and made it
more manageable.
I
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHOICE-OF-LAw THINKING
The choice-of-law problem presents two different, though at
times interrelated, questions: (1) What legal order ultimately
controls-or should control-in a situation or transaction that has
significant connections with more than one state; (2) How should a
given legal order regulate a particular multistate situation or trans-
action? The latter question is usually put in a more restricted form:
Does the legal order wish to regulate a matter under its domestic
rules or under those of another state or states? These are intrinsi-
cally difficult questions, involving considerations and issues that are
not encountered generally in legal analysis. Most legal problems
are studied and handled in terms of the values, purposes, and
institutions of a single, politically organized society. Necessarily,
broader as well as somewhat different ranges of policy are impli-
I There is a special sense in which this paper is explicitly comparative. It was originally
written for the centenary issue of the Journal du Droit International. As such, the presentation
and analysis represent an effort to describe and explain American developments for a
Continental European audience.
2 These areas are discussed in von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966) and von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of
Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1601 (1968).
Extensive discussions and materials for the entire field of private international law are
contained in A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAw OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CoNFLcr OF LAWS (1965).
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cated in multistate situations, and a far greater variety of policy
combinations may be encountered. To complicate matters further,
because most forms of economic and social life are essentially intra-
rather than inter-state in character, any given legal order's experi-
ence in handling multistate situations is small and episodic in
comparison with its experience in handling analogous, fully domes-
tic situations. Moreover, the individual's sense of justice is largely
shaped by experience with the legal order of a single community.
Choice-of-law theory, preoccupied with determining which of
several legal orders concerned with a given multistate situation is
entitled to control, has implicitly assumed that the selected legal
order would regulate the issue under its rules applicable to analo-
gous fully-domestic situations. The only real challenge-and that a
partial and limited one-to this assumption in traditional analysis is
the renvoi theory. 3
Various approaches have been proposed to treat the problem
of selecting the controlling legal order. Some approaches work
with broad policies respecting the requirements of social and
economic intercourse among states. Thus, at an early stage in the
development of American conflicts theory, Joseph Story writes in
his Conflict of Laws that "[t]he true foundation, on which the
administration of international law must rest, is, that the rules,
which are to govern, are those, which arise from mutual interest
and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences, which would result
from a contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do
justice, in order that justice may be done to us in return. '4 Another
school argues that the controlling legal order is determined by the
3 Space does not permit discussion here of the renvoi in this perspective. The matter is
treated in von Mehren, The Renvoi and Its Relation to Various Approaches to the Choice-of-Law
Problem, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 380 (K. Nadelmann, A. von
Mehren & J. Hazard eds. 1961). See also A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF
MULTISTATE PROBLEMS, supra note 2, at 509-16, 549-52.
4 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 35, at 34 (1834) (footnote
omitted). Story adds that the doctrine "leaves behind many grave questions as to its
application .... Id. § 38, at 37. Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws was the first book in
the English language which endeavored to treat the subject as a whole and which relied not
only on common law decisions but drew also on the writings of leading civilians. The eighth
and last edition of the Commentaries, edited by Bigelow, appeared in 1883. For evaluations of
Story, see Lorenzen, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws: One Hundred Years After, 48
HARv. L. REv. 15 (1934); Nadelmann, Some Historical Notes on the Doctrinal Sources of American
Conflicts Law, in Ius Ex LEX-FESTGABE ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG VON MAX GUrZWLLER 263,
272-76 (1959), reprinted in K. NADELMANN, CONFLICT OF LAws: INTERNATIONAL AND IN-
TERSTATE 1, 10-14 (1972); Nadelmann, Joseph Story's Contribution to American Conflicts Law: A
Comment, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HISTORY 230 (1961), reprinted in K. NADELMANN, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: INTERNATIONAL AND INTERSTATE 21 (1972).
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territorial nature of substantive law. Joseph Beale5 suggests that in
the nature of things each community's law reaches only to its
borders. The territorial vision sees the international community as
a well-defined checkerboard with each state's law confined within
the state's boundaries; moreover, each situation or transaction is
firmly centered on one square so that overlapping never occurs. A
third view, often called the local-law theory, had as its leading
spokesman Walter Wheeler Cook. 6 This approach emphasizes the
territorial nature of the administration of justice. The local-law
school also sees the international community as a checkerboard and,
as a particular litigation occurs on only one square, gives at first the
illusion that overlapping is avoided.
The first two approaches obviously cannot provide satisfactory
guidance in selecting the legal order that is to control a given
multistate situation or transaction. Story's formula presents an
attitude but does little to suggest or resolve the hard problems of
analysis and choice that lurk behind an attractive facade. Beale's
theory, for which much larger claims were made, asserts a view of
the legal universe and of the nature of law that is incomplete and,
in many respects, oversimplified and inaccurate. Moreover, even
for a confirmed believer, the dogma of territoriality does not
contain any compelling solution to such intractable problems as
where to place on the territorial checkerboard a contract that is
negotiated by parties physically present in different states or a tort
that involves wrongful conduct in one state and injurious effects in
another.
Cook's local-law approach provides a theory for determining
the formally-controlling legal order. No selection is -involved be-
cause the forum, from the perspective of the source of authority,
always applies forum law, although the given rules may be mod-
5 Professor Joseph H. Beale (1861-1943) taught at Harvard Law School from 1890
to 1938. His TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935)-foreshadowed by numerous
articles-taken together with the first RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), for which
Beale was the Reporter, represented at the time the most significant and influential formula-
tion of American conflicts law since Story.
6 Walter Wheeler Cook's (1873-1943) professional life was devoted to law teaching (e.g.,
Chicago, Yale, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, and Northwestern). He was an exponent of the
realist school of legal thought and education. Between 1919 and 1942 he wrote a series of
articles on conflict of laws which, assembled and supplemented in his THE LOGICAL AND
LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942), exerted great influence on American
thinking in this field.
Another significant writer from the local-law perspective was Professor Ernest G.
Lorenzen whose principal works are collected in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1947).
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eled on the law of another legal order. The theory leaves entirely
unanswered, however, the problem of how the multistate transac-
tion or situation in question is to be regulated. In Story's and
Beale's approaches, the selecting process can be-and is-viewed as
providing the required choice of law. In Cook's theory, the
choice-of-law process cannot stop with the determination of the
legal order whose law, in a technical rather than a more substantive
sense, is applied. Clearly, the forum will not wish to apply its
domestic rules to every matter involving multistate elements liti-
gated in its courts. Yet the local-law theory, as such, provides no
guidance as to when recourse should be had to other rules. Cook
wrote little of a general, theoretical nature regarding the problem
that his local-law theory so clearly posed. He merely suggested that
"the same methods actually used in deciding cases involving purely
domestic torts, contracts, property, etc." should be used and noted
that "[t]he problem involved is that of legal thinking in general. '7
Theories of the kind represented by Story and Beale coalesce
problems-what legal order is to control the situation and how it
will wish to control-that Cook's analysis separates. This merger
and the attendant emphasis on the selection issue raise difficulties.
First, merger causes the selecting process to focus upon considera-
tions relevant to the allocation of authority among legal orders and
to ignore the subtle problem of how a given legal order wishes to
regulate the multistate transaction or situation in question. The
result is that one's sense of justice is not infrequently offended; the
legal order selected may have a legitimate and acceptable claim to
control, but control in terms of its domestic rule often cannot be
justified in terms of the policies and values that the domestic rule
seeks to advance.
Concentration upon the problem of selection also tends to
inhibit precise analysis of the question of when a given legal order
will wish to regulate a multistate transaction or situation under a
rule other than its domestic rule. The problem of selecting a
controlling legal order can be initially approached by asking
whether the various concerned legal orders have, in view of the
policies underlying their putatively applicable domestic rules, any
reason to wish to regulate a given matter. Without any doubt,
thinking along these lines influenced in some degree the results
reached by such jurists as Beale and Story. But, since the formal
components of the analysis often seek to exclude and, in any event,
7 W. CooK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAws 43 (1942).
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do not emphasize this problem, thinking on the issue is not
rigorous and theory is neither shaped nor advanced.
Third, exclusive emphasis on the selection problem to the
exclusion of the question of how a given legal order would wish to
regulate probably multiplies conflicts unnecessarily. This result
comes about for several reasons. Differences of considerable tech-
nical significance between domestic rules and principles of differ-
ent states frequently do not reflect substantial policy differences.
Consequently, the concerned communities in a multistate situation
could often find either of two technically different rules acceptable.
In addition, a number of special policies and considerations-in
particular workability and the facilitation of multistate activity--
derive from the very fact that a situation is multistate. The weight
of such policies in a given multistate situation may cause a legal
order to regulate a matter under a non-domestic rule even though
there are reasons that support application of its domestic rule.
Finally, the multistate configuration of a problem may cause the
policies that support a rule in its fully domestic application to fall
away; other policies that are subordinated by the society in pursuit
of the aforesaid policies would then emerge and support a treat-
ment of the multistate situation different from that afforded
analogous domestic situations.
Another difficulty produced by coalescing the two issues of the
controlling legal order and how it wishes to control is that theories
of-and criteria for-the selecting process are often developed and
tested in contexts where there is ultimately no real conflict of policy
between the two or more legal orders significantly concerned with
a given multistate problem. Consequently, as selection theory and
practice have not been forged in the crucible of difficulty, the rule
may not survive a real challenge. Where one senses, even though
only dimly and intuitively, that there may be a siguificant di-
vergence between forum policy and the policy of the legal order
indicated by conventionally accepted selection theory and practice,
there is a strong tendency to escape from the formal theory's
imperatives in an essentially undisciplined and ad hoc fashion.
Escape may take the form of changing a characterization, resorting
to public policy, or utilizing the renvoi.8
In sum, the inevitable consequence of approaching the
choice-of-law problem exlusively in terms of jurisdiction-selecting
analyses is a looseness and incoherence of theory and practice. A
facade of order and principle prevails, but the reality that it
s See note 3 supra.
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conceals is far more complex than theory admits or suggests.
Consequently, theories such as those adumbrated by Story and
Beale have little explanatory or directive force. They serve as ex post
facto rationalizations for results often reached on other grounds,
thus failing to discipline and criticize theory and practice.
The difficulties and limitations inherent in a preoccupation
with selecting the legal order entitled to control multistate situa-
tions and the related failure to grapple with the problem of how a
legal order would wish to regulate these situations ultimately pro-
duced a Copernican revolution in American thinking. Analysis
shifted to the second aspect of the choice-of-law problem, how a
given legal order will wish to regulate the transaction or situation.
Those who embraced Cook's local-law theory in a reaction to
Bealean vested rights could hardly avoid this issue. The proposi-
tion that, in terms of the source of authority, the forum always
applies its own law was useful in its time and place as an antidote to
territorial and vested-rights dogmas, but of slight help to those who
must decide choice-of-law questions.9 Thus, one who realized the
incompleteness of the local-law theory was nevertheless helped by
it to see the inadequacies and ambiguities of choice-of-law practice
based on the approaches of such theorists as Story and Beale. A
natural reaction was to turn attention to the question of how a
given legal order would wish to regulate particular choice-of-law
problems.
In the American literature, the first general theoretical ap-
proach to the choice-of-law problem in terms of the regulating rule
is an article written in 1933 by David F. Cavers. 10 Cavers first
criticizes traditional approaches for seeking exclusively "to deter-
mine the jurisdiction whose law should govern the question at
issue."1 He notes that even with the reaction against territorial and
vested-right theories and a connected "recognition that considera-
tions of justice and social expediency should be, and in many cases
have been, the dominant determinants of problems in this field. Yet
these considerations are still harnessed to the old task of devising
(or justifying) rules for selecting the appropriate jurisdiction whose
9 Professor Hessel Yntema criticized Cook on precisely this ground. See Yntema, The
Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. CoMP. LAW 297, 316-17 (1953).
10 See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REv. 173 (1933).
Professor David F. Cavers, born 1902, was a member of the Duke Law Faculty from 1931 to
1945 and of the Harvard Law School Faculty from 1929 to 1930 and from 1945 to 1969. At
Duke, he created and edited the quarterly Law and Contemporary Problems. His professional
interests are manifold and include an abiding concern for the field of conflict of laws.
11 Id. at 178 (emphasis in original).
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law should govern a given case." 12 He proposes that attention
should be "focussed upon the problem of what should be the
proper result in [the given case], as distinguished from the prob-
lem of what rule is the proper one to select a jurisdiction whose law
should govern.. ,,13 Cavers summarizes his approach as follows:
When a court is faced with a question whether to reject, as
inapplicable, the [domestic] law of the forum and to admit in
evidence, as determinative of an issue in a case before it, a rule of
law of a foreign jurisdiction, it should
(1) scrutinize the event or transaction giving rise to the issue
before it;
(2) compare carefully the proffered rule of law and the
result which its application might work in the case at bar
with the rule of the forum (or other competing jurisdic-
don) and its effect therein;
(3) appraise these results in the light of those facts in the
event or transaction which, from the standpoint of jus-
tice between the litigating individuals or of those
broader considerations of social policy which conflicting
laws may evoke, link that event or transaction to one law
or the other; recognizing
b) in the evaluation of contacts, that the contact
achieves significance in proportion to the significance
of the action or circumstance constituting it when
related to the controversy and the solutions thereto
which the competing laws propound. 4
In this pioneering article, Cavers neither develops his analysis
fully nor explores its inherent problems. His methodological
suggestions begin with a description of proper analysis of fully
domestic problems or situations. "They demand a penetrating
analysis of the controversy and the transaction out of which it
arose, an exacting inquiry into and appraisal of the competing
rules, a deliberate weighing of the equities. 1 5 The same general
approach is to be used in resolving multistate problems. Thus, a
court should undertake "a painstaking examination of the same
factors whose materiality would be admitted were the case a purely
local one, together with those additional factors which the inter-
state character of the transaction raises into prominence. 1 6 Consid-
12 Id.
13 Id. at 191.
14 Id. at 192-93.
15 Id. at 187.
16 Id. at 188. it must not be inferred from the passages quoted that Gavers at the time
opposed the formulation of choice-of-law rules. On the contrary, he believed they could and
should be developed. See id. at 193-96.
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eration is not given to whether analysis of multistate problems along
these lines implicates issues and involves dilemmas that are not en-
countered in fully domestic problems. Nor is more than passing
attention given to how the ultimately controlling legal order is to be
selected in the event that the proposed analysis reveals a real differ-
ence of opinion among the concerned jurisdictions. Here Cavers
appears to suggest that the forum's view as to which of the competing
rules is better in a general, jurisprudential sense can on occasion be
decisive.' 7
If Cavers's article can be viewed as stimulating for the first
time in American choice-of-law thinking an interest at the level of
general analysis in the question of how a particular legal order
would wish to regulate a given multistate situation or transaction,
the most provocative formulation of the general approach is found
in the writings of Brainerd Currie.' 8 Currie begins with an analysis
of forum law:
[T]he court should, first of all, determine the governmental
policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire
whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to
provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the
application of that policy ....
[Then, if] necessary, the court should similarly determine
the policy expressed by the foreign law, and whether the foreign
state has an interest in the application of its policy.' 9
When these questions are answered, the problem of selecting the
controlling legal order must be faced: "If the court finds that the
forum state has no interest in the application of its policy, but that
the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law." However,
"[i]f the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the
application of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even
though the foreign state also has an interest in the application of its
contrary policy, and, a fortiori, it should apply the law of the
17 Compare Cavers's discussion of transactions in which the result turns on the contrac-
tual capacity of infants and married women. Id. at 189-90. Cavers remarks "in the course of
... evaluation, the court's opinion as to the desirability of limitations upon the contractual
capadty of infants and married women will inevitably enter." Id. at .190. More recently,
Cavers has grown less resigned to this tendency and has evidenced concern with an
apparently increasing resort to the "better law" approach. See text accompanying notes 71-74
infra.
18 Brainerd Currie (1912-1965) was professor of law at the University of Cbicago and
Duke University. Roughly the last two decades of his career were largely devoted to
scholarship in the field of choice of law. His principal artides on the subject are collected and
published in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
19 Id. at 183-84. Currie uses "law of the forum" in the sense of domestic-law rules and
principles.
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forum if the foreign state has no such interest." 20 Currie thus asks
the question whether the concerned jurisdictions, beginning with
the forum, desire to regulate the question under their domestic-law
rule. This formulation glosses over the fact that a legal order which
does not wish to regulate a matter under its domestic rule usually
has, nonetheless, a view regarding how the problem should be
handled. In order to state the problem accurately, a more com-
prehensive formula is required: How does each legal order desire
to regulate the matter? Nevertheless, Currie's analysis has the merit
of separating the two issues that arise in choice-of-law problems. In
his writing, the problem of whether a given legal order wishes to
regulate in terms of its domestic rules dominates analysis and
discussion; the problem of selection where several legal orders seek
to regulate in a contradictory fashion is viewed as insolvable at least
by courts and juristic theory, in any fashion other than application
of the forum's domestic-law rule.21
Just as Story's and Beale's approaches illustrate the ambiguities
and deficiencies that inhere in choice-of-law theories that address
themselves essentially to the problem of selecting the controlling
legal order, Currie's position reveals the ineluctable problems of
any effort to determine whether-or, more broadly, how-a given
community wishes to regulate a given multistate problem or situa-
tion. Analysis of his views also makes clear the interconnections
between the regulation and selection issues.
Currie's approach to the question whether a community wishes
to regulate under its domestic rule a given multistate problem or
situation begins by recognizing two important propositions. First, a
domestic rule or principle may rest on several supportive policies;
second, the local rule applied to fully domestic situations may
represent a subordination of competing policies. Thus, a rule that
married women lack capacity to contract subordinates a "policy of
security of transactions to [a] policy of protecting married women. '22
The first proposition is obvious. Rules of tort law permitting
recovery against one who negligently injures another may rest on
mutually reinforcing policies of compensation and conduct regula-
tion. Or, to take another example, statutes restricting the right of a
guest to sue his host-driver for injuries suffered in an automobile
accident can express both a view that the guest in suing would be
20 Id. at 184.
21 Currie does allow for a "restrained and moderate" definition of forum policy. See text
accompanying notes 30-33 infra.
22 B. CURmE, supra note 18, at 85.
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showing an unacceptable lack of gratitude and a conviction that
such actions involve a high risk of host-guest collusion to the
detriment of insurance carriers and the general public. In fully
domestic situations, it is rarely necessary to decide what the effects
of the disappearance of one of several supportive policies would
be. On the other hand, the disappearance phenomenon is often
encountered in an analysis along the general lines advocated by
Currie. Thus, if the host-driver comes from a community in which
a guest can sue and the car is registered and insured in that
community, while the guest lives in a community having a guest
statute, the collusion policy arguably no longer supports applica-
tion of the guest statute.
Although Currie recognizes that this phenomenon occurs, he
has relatively little to say about its significance for the choice-of-law
problem. His emphasis, in various contexts, upon the difficulties
and possible improprieties involved in the judicial ascertainment
and evaluation of policy-particularly where another community's
rules and policies are in question 2 3-suggests that he would ordi-
narily consider the forum's domestic rules applicable if any sig-
nificant policy remained supportive without regard to the disap-
pearance in the multistate context of other policies importantly
supportive in the fully domestic setting. A forum would consider
its guest statute applicable if either of the policies supportive in a
fully domestic situation-collusion to the detriment of insurance
carriers and the general public, and unacceptable lack of
gratitude-is relevant in the given multistate situation. Currie's
reluctance to become involved with the subordination phenome-
non is also seen in his seeming unwillingness to consider even the
possibility of subordination unless the policy favoring subordina-
tion is one generally recognized by contemporary societies. Thus,
Currie does not view the rule giving contractual capacity to mar-
ried women as subordinating a protective policy to a policy of
security of transactions.24 No doubt Currie's conclusion is correct
for the majority of cases; protective policies relating to special
classes or groups of persons tend to disappear rapidly when they
are no longer expressed in legal rules. Married women, once their
incapacity ends, are probably soon viewed by the society as being
like any other contracting party. Nevertheless, Currie's refusal to
entertain the possibility that in some situations a protective policy
2' See, e.g., id. at 181-83, 603-06.
24 Id at 86.
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may be subordinated by a domestic-law rule favoring security of
transactions is not satisfactorily explained.
Analytically, still another range of policies-those implicated
through the problem's multistate nature-deserve consideration in
any effort to determine whether and how a legal order wishes to
regulate a given multistate situation. For instance, in a fully domes-
tic situation a legal order that denies contractual capacity to mar-
ried women may assume that-merchants and others can and will
take this rule into account in their economic activity. On the other
hand, in a multistate situation there may be no reason for the party
dealing with a married woman to consider the possibility that she
lacks contractual capacity. Here, a policy of protecting legitimate
expectations, irrelevant in analogous fully domestic situations, re-
quires attention. Likewise, a multistate situation can involve
policies-such as the facilitation of multistate activity-that are
peculiar to the multistate context.
As one might expect from his general approach as described
above, Currie says relatively little about policies that emerge be-
cause of the multistate nature of a transaction or situation. Pre-
sumably, Currie is prepared to recognize such policies and to
consider them in his analysis, since "there is room for restraint and
enlightenment in the determination of what state policy is and
where state interests lie."'25 Indeed, such considerations could play
a decisive role in delineating the scope of a state's interest in order
to avoid a "conflict with foreign interests that may result from a too
selfish and provincial determination. ''2 6 But Currie never develops
the point; perhaps he perceived that the required line of analysis
could endanger the relative simplicity of his approach and also
require the courts to perform functions for which he felt they were
unfitted .27
Thus, the analysis through which Currie would determine how
a legal order wishes to regulate a given multistate situation or
transaction excludes issues and possibilities that are relevant in
terms of his basic methodology. The exclusion is less radical in the
case of the forum than in that of other legal orders. But, even for
the forum, Currie would typically give a rather simplistic answer in
terms of the domestic rule so long as a single, significant policy
continued to support that rule. He would not consider closely
whether subordinated and multistate policies called for another
25 Id. at 186.
26 Id. at 592.
27 See id. at 604-06.
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solution. Unless the reasons for so limiting the inquiry are convinc-
ing to those who utilize this methodology, ambiguity and uncer-
tainty are necessarily produced. An approach in terms of analyzing
whether and how a legal order wishes to regulate a multistate
situation does not in itself suggest or contain these limitations.
Consequently, unless justified by reference to compelling consider-
ations of another kind, these limitations are arbitrary. And, even if
not arbitrary, the question remains whether conclusions are sound
that must be based on a significantly restricted application of a
methodology.
Any effort to understand how a jurisdiction wishes to regulate
a given multistate situation or transaction must also determine
which connections between a community and the situation or
transaction implicate policies held in domestic situations by the
community's legal order. Currie recognizes this problem of linkage
and remarks, for instance, that "there is no need to exclude the
possibility of rational altruism: for example, when a state has
determined upon the policy of placing upon local industry all the
social costs of the enterprise, it may well decide to adhere to this
policy regardless of where the harm occurs and who the victim
is."" But such issues are not explored in depth.
Several points deserve fuller consideration. In the case of
compensation policies, the linkage problem may require more
careful and complete articulation of supporting policies than is
usual: Is responsibility imposed simply to compensate the injured
party or also to require those who create certain classes of risks
either to bear them personally or to shift them through insurance
to a larger group comprised of all members of the community who
create comparable risks or who utilize the product or service? A
policy such as condemnation of ingratitude, supportive of a guest
statute, raises a slightly different aspect of the linkage issue: Is a
given legal order entitled to police the conscience of those who have
no long-term relations with the community? Religions and systems
of ethics typically are universalistic; do legal rules with religious or
ethical bases make similarly universal claims? And, if so, should
other legal orders give weight to such claims? Presumably, to the
extent that law is viewed as instrumental and as rooted in a given
society, no policy supportive of a legal rule or principle is of
necessarily universal application. In all events, the linkage problem
deserves more thoughtful, consideration than it receives from Cur-
rie.
28 Id. at 186 (footnote omitted).
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The foregoing demonstrates that Currie avoids, by limiting the
scope of his inquiry and analysis, many of the difficulties that
inhere in a comprehensive effort to determine how a legal order
would wish to regulate a given multistate transaction or situation.
The limitation is least drastic-but still significant-where the legal
order in question is the forum. How satisfying, then, can the
results of investigation be when the analysis is, in its own terms,
incomplete? Can we comfortably accept Currie's demonstrations
that no conflict exists among concerned jurisdictions with respect
to a given multistate solution? Can we rest secure in his views as to
when the forum would wish to regulate the matter under its
domestic rule?
Similar doubts arise with regard to Currie's handling of the
second aspect of the choice-of-law problem, choosing among legal
orders, each of which has a legitimate "interest in the application of
its law and policy. ' 29 The limits set by Currie to policy analysis also
undermine any efforts to exercise "judicial statesmanship" to avoid
"the conflict with foreign interests that may result from a too selfish
and provincial determination" of a state's interests.30 Hence, the
exercise of "restraint and enlightenment in the determination of
what state policy is and where state interests lie"'3I becomes corre-
spondingly problematic.
Still other difficulties adhere to Currie's approach to the prob-
lem of selecting the controlling legal order in the event of true
conflict. Currie originally sought to render the problem manage-
able by requiring the application of forum law whenever there is "a
legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application"
of "the governmental policy expressed in the law of the forum. 32
Under this formulation, the forum presumably would not take into
account policies respecting relations and intercourse among sepa-
rate legal orders, but which are not directly related to the
domestic-law rule potentially applicable.33 Later, Currie advocated
restrained and moderate definition of the forum's policy, an ap-
proach that must include recognition of multistate policies. Yet, he
hardly touched the problems of just what these policies are and how
they are to be weighed against the forum's domestic-law policies.
Nor does Currie consider whether such determinations require
29 Id. at 189.
30 Id. at 592.
31 Id. at 186.
32 Id. at 183.
11 Cf. Cavers, The Conditional Seller's Remedies and the Choice-of-Law Process, 35 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1126, 1138 (1960).
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rather full understanding of how other concerned legal orders
wish to handle the particular multistate situation.
The preceding discussion is sufficient to suggest that the
simplicity and rationality that Currie claimed for his methodology
are as elusive, in their way, as that claimed by Beale. Currie's
professed starting points are, unlike those of Beale, firmly rooted
in an instrumental and sociological view of law. Consequently,
Currie's premises have a greater explanatory power and form a
more acceptable basis for decision than do Beale's assumptions
respecting the territorial nature of law. But the inability or
unwillingness-at least on Currie's part-to accept fully the logic of
the method diminishes its explanatory power. Currie's refusal to
follow through with the logic of his methodology is inherent in his
effort to keep the approach simple.34 For those who find the
limitations within which Currie works comfortable and appro-
priate, the result is considerable simplicity. However, just as in the
case of Beale, simplicity must be paid for by accepting propositions
that cannot be explained or justified in terms of the methodology.
II
THEORETICAL DIFFICULTIES
How well do the approaches of Story, Beale, Cook, Cavers,
and Currie satisfy the juristic standards normally applied to the
formulation and administration of legal rules and principles? Any
answer must begin with an attempt to state briefly those standards,
In large measure, legal rules and principles are today viewed
instrumentally as designed to advance certain values and purposes
with a minimum of expense to competing values and purposes.
Rules are to be applied teleologically. Justice requires that these
rules and their administration be principled; similar treatment is to
be accorded equivalent patterns of value and purpose.
None of the choice-of-law methodologies examined fully meets
the first standard. Story and Beale have little to offer on the
general problem of instrumentalism; Cavers, in his writing dis-
cussed ahove, and Cook urge an instrumental approach, but say
relatively little about its specific implicatons for choice of law.3
34 Compare Leflar's observation: "Simplicity of rule and ease ofjudicial administration
were the prime considerations underlying Currie's system, just as with Beale's system,
though for different reasons." R. LEFLAR, AMECAN CONFLCrs LAw § 101, at 234 (1968)
(footnote omitted).
35 In his more recent writing, discussed in text accompanying notes 71-99 infra, Cavers
treats aspects of these problems at length.
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Currie comes closest to providing an instrumental method but, at
least by standards developed in dealing with single-state situations,
his analysis is oversimplified and involves arbitrary exclusions. 36
These shortcomings in choice-of-law methodologies, when meas-
ured against the general standards of instrumental jurisprudence,
are in some measure inescapable. A teleological approach in mul-
tistate situations involves inherently greater difficulties and am-
biguities than are encountered when the same approach is applied
in a single-state context. At the threshold is the difficulty of
ascertaining and stating the relevant policies held by concerned
jurisdictions. Jurists find this task difficult and delicate enough
when they confront it in their own legal orders; further complica-
tions inevitably arise in multistate situations. Understanding of
values and purposes ultimately derives from long participation in a
society's life. Judgments dealing with problem areas of domestic
law benefit from sustained professional analysis and criticism and
are subject to correction through the community's political proces-
ses. In assessing the values and purposes of other legal orders,
jurists enjoy few, if any, of these advantages. 37 Moreover, -multi-
state problems present a range of policies and values-those relat-
ing to effective and harmonious intercourse and relations between
and among communities-that do not arise in single-state situa-
tions. Finally, the sheer number of relevant policies and considera-
tions multiplies rapidly as the views of other legal orders are taken
into account. Full instrumental analysis of choice-of-law problems
thus becomes elusive in view of the almost endless variations that
are possible.38
36 See text accompanying notes 22-32 supra.
37 Compare Judge Breitel's remark in his dissenting opinion in Tooker v. Lopez: "Intra-
mural speculation on the policies of other States has obvious limitations because of restricted
information and wisdom. It is difficult enough to interpret the statutes and decisional rules
of one's own State." 24 N.Y.2d 569, 597, 249 N.E.2d 394, 411, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 543
(1969).
3 Professor Reese has recently noted that to
determine what policy or policies underlie the relevant decisional or statutory local
law rules of the potentially interested states . . . will often prove an onerous,
difficult, and frustrating task. Under the best of circumstances, the amount of
judicial time spent in trying to ferret out these policies is likely to be considerable;
after all possible work has been done, the exact nature of these policies may still
remain indeterminate.
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315, 317 (1972). See also
Kahn-Freund, Delictual Liability and the Conflict of Laws, in ACAD&MIE DE DROIT INTERNA-
IONAL DE LA HAYE, 1968-II RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 60-62.
This task can be simplified by working with the purposes that general comparative
analysis views as informing the rules or principles in question. The purposes thus identified
could be enlarged or restricted by investigation directed to the particular legal order in
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In considering whether the several methodologies discussed
satisfy the requirement that rules and their administration be
principled, this requirement's possible meaning in multistate situa-
tions must be explored. In multistate affairs identical situations can
be handled by several legal orders. Is it unprincipled for these legal
orders to reach different results? Differing results may be disturb-
ing, but they do not seem unprincipled. So long as a legal order
treats in a similar fashion situations that are, in terms of its values
and purposes, equivalent, the results are principled in the sense of
being consequent. In this respect, although one may well conclude
that the approach is parochial and ignores requirements that flow
from a legal order's participation in an international economic and
social order, Currie does not advocate unprincipled decisions when
he writes:
There remains the stubborn fact that under any conceivable
conflict-of-laws method the interests of one state will be sacrificed
to those of another whenever there is conflict. The only virtue of
[my] method... is that it at least makes the choice of interests on
a rational and objective basis: the forum consistently applies its
own law in case of conflict, and thus at least advances its domestic
policy. This is not an ideal; it is simply the best that is available.39
"Unprincipled" has another, somewhat different, meaning.
Speaking in terms of a single community, it is unprincipled to
apply to one case a rule that one is not prepared to generalize for
all analogous cases. Currie's rule of forum preference can be
viewed as unprincipled in this sense, unless the state holding it
would, as a member of the international community, advocate its
universal adoption. However, it must be recognized that in an
imperfect community-one that lacks a common legislature and
judiciary-the attainment of solutions principled in this second
sense is extremely difficult. A kind of Gresham's law operates: each
of the involved legal orders hesitates to adopt principled solutions
for fear that the others will be less principled. Here again, the
realities of the multistate situation are very different from those of
analogous fully-domestic situations.
One of the merits of Beale's approach, so long as jurists were
able to live by its precepts, was that its results were principled in
question. Unless there appeared to be a reasonably clear basis for deviating from the pattern
of purpose generally informing the rule or principle in question this would not occur.
Comparative law research and writing, which has significantly increased in recent decades,
can here provide a valuable service to conflict of laws. E.g., FORMATION OF CONTRAcTs: A
STUDY OF THE COMMON COPE OF LEGAL SYsTEMs (R. Schlesinger gen. ed. 1968).
39 B. CuRmE, supra note 18, at 169.
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the second of the senses discussed above, and appeared to be so in
the first as well unless one compares various situations in instru-
mental terms. On the other hand, the virtues, instrumentally
speaking, of methodologies of the kind advocated by Cook, Cavers,
and Currie involve the price of a strong tendency toward unprin-
cipled, in the second sense of self-regarding, results. Currie's view
that a forum should define its interests in a restrained and moder-
ate fashion, avoiding "a too selfish and provincial determination,' 40
reflects a desire to escape the unprincipled solutions that his earlier
formulation required. 41 Similarly, in recent years Cavers has ex-
pended considerable effort in seeking to develop principles of
preference that will provide choice-of-law solutions that are both
instrumental and principled in the sense of not being self-
regarding.42 For the reasons already suggested, it is inherently
more difficult to avoid unprincipled decisions in the handling of
multistate situations than in dealing with analogous single-state
situations. Nonetheless, the tendency of contemporary instrumen-
tal approaches to choice-of-law toward self-regairding results is a
serious defect. This problem and efforts to overcome it are further
considered below. 43
It seems fair to conclude that none of the choice-of-law
methodologies discussed fully meets the standards normally set for
the administration of justice in single-state situations. The question
remains whether any choice-of-law methodology, no matter how
developed and refined, can fully satisfy these standards. If not,jurists
face the rather somber prospect of being condemned-at least in the
absence of international conventions-to methodologies that, al-
though the best available, are not fully satisfactory.
An answer to this question can begin by dismissing from
further consideration methodologies of the type advocated by
Story and Beale. Their defects are so radical when tested against
instrumental standards that they are simply unacceptable today.
Story's approach has little explanatory power and could gain such
40 Id. at 592.
41 Currie's considerable effort to find a basis for principled solutions in the privileges
and immunities clause and the equal protection dause of the Constitution of the United
States evinces the same concern. See B. CURRIE, supra note 18, at 445-525, Chapter X,
Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities; B. CURRIE, supra
note 18, at 526-83, Chapter XI, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal
Protection. These two chapters were written in collaboration with Professor Herma Hill
Schreter, now Kay.
42 See text accompanying notes 71-97 infra.
41 See text accompanying notes 44-103 infra.
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only by a metamorphosis into a policy-based analysis. Beale's ap-
proach has the fundamental difficulty of requiring the acceptance
of conceptions and propositions that are not rooted in experience
and do not reflect in any direct and consistent fashion the values
and purposes that contemporary legal orders seek to advance.
Challenged by sociological jurisprudence, the jurisprudence of
conceptions has declined in the choice-of-law field as it has more
generally. Choice-of-law theory and practice cannot long remain
insulated from the main currents of general legal thought.
The problem becomes, therefore, whether policy-based
analyses can overcome to any significant degree the above-noted
shortcomings. The easier portion of the task will be to improve the
analysis both of the policies held by the concerned legal orders and of
these policies' reach. Increased experience should permit courts and
jurists to be more articulate on both issues. Greater attention will
gradually be given to the problem of subordinated policies and to
policies that arise because of a situation's multistate character. In
time, the jurisprudence of legal orders using policy-based analyses
should make understanding each other's policies easier and more
reliable. Although this enterprise will never be as comfortable and
reliable as is policy analysis in a single-state situation, there is reason to
hope that generally acceptable levels can be reached.44
It will, however, probably be more difficult to moderate the
tendency of policy-based approaches to eventuate in unprincipled
results. The problem is greater than has so far been suggested. In
multistate situations, issues of comprehensibility and invidiousness
(in the sense of results that are perceived as unfair) are associated
with the issue of unprincipledness. 45 Incomprehensible or invidi-
ous results are, in a sense, the lay analogy of the jurist's unprinc-
pled results. When a layman cannot understand distinctions taken
or when he considers them unfair, the justice of the result is called
into question. Incomprehensibility and invidiousness can be prob-
lems in single-state situations, but multistate situations have a much
greater potential for causing difficulty. In particular, difficulties
44 On occasion, the objection is made to the general methodology under discussion that
it is improper in an international context-as distinguished from a federal setting-for one
legal order to explore and weigh the policies of another. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 38.
For a policy-based analysis the alternative would seem to be to iguore completely the views of
the foreign legal order. It is hard to see why this result should be preferred or why inquiries
that are undertaken in a reasoned effort to resolve appropriately a problem in which both
legal orders are concerned should be viewed as officious intermeddling by one of them.
45 It should be noted that a generally accepted terminology has not yet emerged for
discussion of these issues. The effort here is to consider, as it may be appropriate, the
individual's sense of justice.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
regarding comprehensibility are generated by multistate situations
because lay understanding may well be shaped by territorial con-
siderations, even though these are seen as otherwise relatively
unimportant by a policy-based analysis. Judge Breitel made the
point in his dissenting opinion in Tooker v. Lopez: 46
Unless conflicts rules move over to substitute a completely per-
sonal law for the territorial system that infuses Anglo-American
jurisprudence and underlies the understanding and expectations
of Americans, it is still true that the law of a territory governs the
conduct and qualifiedly the status of persons, resident and non-
resident, within it, except in the extraordinary situation where
the localization of persons and conduct is adventitious.47
Incomprehensible results are also likely to be taken as invidi-
ous, as are distinctions resting upon the personal law of one of the
parties. Judge Wyzanski advanced this proposition in an alienation of
affections case:
[A] doctrine that in all matrimonial tort cases the right to
maintain a suit against a local defendant . . . turns on the
matrimonial domicil of the plaintiff [takes a distinction which]
* . . the lay plaintiff will regard... as involving a personal dis-
crimination against him rather than as a step toward comity be-
tween states.48
III
Babcock AND ITS PROGENY
Before examining theories designed to deal with the in-
tertwined problems of unprincipled, incomprehensible, and invidi-
ous results,4 9 it is instructive to illustrate the general problem by
examining a series of important New York decisions. The discus-
sion will also serve to illustrate the form that a policy-based ap-
proach to choice of law has taken in an influential state court. The
cases to be examined all involve whether a guest can recover from
his host-driver for injuries suffered in an automobile accident
because of the latter's negligence.
The seminal decision-one of great importance generally for
contemporary American choice-of-law theory and practice-is Bab-
cock v. Jackson.50 In that case, a New York guest was invited in New
46 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
47 Id. at 593, 249 N.E.2d at 409, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 540.
48 Gordon v. Parker, 83 F. Supp. 40, 43 (D. Mass. 1949).
4' See text accompanying notes 68-103 infra.
50 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (5-2 decision).
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York by a New York driver to drive to Ontario for a short trip. In
Ontario, the car went out of control and crashed into a wall,
injuring the guest. Ontario had a guest statute which precluded
recovery against the driver; New York allowed recovery in such
cases. Suit was brought in New York and the guest recovered. In
terms of instrumental analysis of the policies presumably underly-
ing the competing domestic rules regarding guest recovery, the
choice-of-law problem seems relatively simple. We can speculate
that Ontario-wary of possible collusion to the detriment of insur-
ance companies, and, ultimately, seeking to protect the community
from higher premiums-has in purely domestic situations subordi-
nated policies of deterrence and compensation to policies disfavor-
ing ungrateful guests. Presumably, none of the latter policies
reached situations where the guest is habitully resident in New
York and the insurance coverage was written the'e.51 Consequent-
ly, the policies of deterrence and compensation 52 that are subordi-
nated for domestic situations revive, and Ontario has no basis, at
least so far as policies clustering around the guest-statute problem
are concerned, to deny recovery. (The Court of Appeals's analysis
of Ontario's position was less complete; no mention was made of
the ungrateful guest policy nor of the revival of policies subordi-
nated by Ontario for fully domestic situations.)
From New York's perspective, the situation is also clear-cut. By
not having a guest statute, New York in domestic situations ad-
vances policies of deterrence and compensation. If the
ungrateful-guest policy and the anticollusion policy have any
weight, they are subordinated. Presumably, the deterrence policy
represented by New York's domestic rule is less significant in the
Babcock situation since the conduct and injury occurred elsewhere,
but the compensation policy clearly applies with undiminished
force. There is little reason to doubt the accuracy of the New York
Court of Appeals' conclusion that New York would wish to regu-
late the given multistate situations in the same way as an analogous
fully domestic situation.
So far as the policies associated with the relevant domestic
rules are concerned, an instrumental analysis indicates that both
Ontario and New York should allow the guest to recover. How-
51 This assumes that a society's legal rules are not universal in their claims and that the
relationship of the guest and of the insurance operation to Ontario did not bring into play
the specific policies underlying its guest statute.
52 Ontario's deterrence policy expressed in general rules of delictual liability dearly
reaches the situation. Its compensation policy may be viewed as attenuated, but not fully
excluded, because the injured person is a member of another community.
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ever, in view of the multistate nature of the situation, the issues of
comprehensibility and invidiousness require attention. Does the
fact that the accident occurred in Ontario constitute a significant
argument against applying New York's domestic rule? Since the
host-guest relationship was created in New York between New
York domiciliaries, and the occurrence of the accident in Ontario
can be viewed as "fortuitous,' 53 permitting the guest to recover
against the host should be entirely comprehensible to the New
York parties and to the New York and Ontario communities in
general. If geography strongly shapes lay understandings and
expectations, the territorial connections of the situation as a whole
with New York are sufficiently strong, and those with Ontario are
so essentially casual, that the application of the New York rule
seems thoroughly understandable. Consequently, unless permitting
recovery here would call for drawing of incomprehensible or
invidious distinctions in related fact situations, both New York and
Ontario should permit recovery.54
Does allowing recovery in Babcock call for invidious distinctions
in related fact situations? The question can be explored in three
contexts. In the first, New Yorkers who are away from home
for fairly substantial periods of time establish a host-guest relation-
ship abroad and an accident abroad follows. The second situation
has a New Yorker inviting a nonresident in New York and an
accident occurring in the guest's home state. In the third case, the
invitation and the accident both take place in the guest's home
state. In all cases, the place of accident has a guest statute that bars
recovery in analogous fully domestic situations.
The New York Court of Appeals dealt with the first situation
in two decisions: Dym v. Gordon55 and Tooker v. Lopez.56 In both
cases, the host and guest were New Yorkers attending a university
in another state.57 Analysis along the lines undertaken above for
53 The majority opinion speaks of "the purely adventitious circumstance that the
accident occurred" in Ontario and describes Ontario as "the place of the fortuitous
occurrence of the accident." 12 N.Y.2d at 482, 483, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at
750, 751.
54 If the Ontario community considers shockingly immoral the ingratitude shown by a
guest in suing his host, a suit brought in Ontario could be dismissed without prejudice to
further proceedings in New York. Strong moral revulsion justifies a refusal on the ground of
ordre public to adjudicate a controversy, but not the giving ofjudgment on the merits for the
defendant.
55 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (4-3 decision).
56 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969) (4-3 decision).
57 The host and guest were students at a summer session in the Dym case. In Tooker,
they were undergraduate students in attendance during the regular academic year. In both
cases, the guest statute in question permitted recovery where wilful misconduct or gross
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the Babcock case indicates that if only policies informing the com-
peting domestic rules are considered, recovery should be permit-
ted.58 The Court of Appeals so held in the Tooker case. The "case is
one of the simplest in the choice-of-law area. 59
New York's "grave concern" in affording recovery for the
injuries suffered by Catharina Tooker, a New York domiciliary,
and the loss suffered by her family as a result of her wrongful
death, is evident merely in stating the policy which our law
reflects. On the other hand, Michigan has no interest in whether a
New York plaintiff is denied recovery against a New York defen-
dant where the car is insured here.60
In the earlier Dym decision, which Tooker must be taken to
overrule, 61 the majority had taken a different tack, placing consid-
erable emphasis upon the fact that the place of the accident was
not "fortuitous" or "adventitious."
[T]he parties were dwelling in Colorado when the relationship
was formed and the accident arose out of Colorado based activi-
ty; therefore, the fact that the accident occurred in Colorado
could in no sense be termed fortuitous. Thus it is that in this case
where Colorado has such significant contacts with the relationship
itself and the basis of its formation the application of its law and
underlying policy are dearly warranted. 62
The Court employed rather different methodologies in the
two cases.63 In Tooker, the court considered only the policies spe-
negligence on the part of the host-driver could be established. It can also be pointed out that
the accident in Dym involved another car and the court in that case attached some
significance to the suggestion that a guest statute serves in such cases to give injured persons
in the other car a priority over the guest in seeking recovery against the host-driver. (In
Tooker, the court stated in dictum that this view was erroneous. See 24 N.Y.2d at 574-75, 239
N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523.) Presumably, this policy, if decisive, could have been
recognized by subordinating the gueses recovery to other claims arising from the accident
instead of denying recovery entirely.
58 If a policy against ungratefulness underlies the gnest statutes, the place of accident
has a somewhat greater claim to govern than it did in Babcock because the guests stand in a
closer relationship to the local community.
59 24 N.Y.2d at 576, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
60 24 N.Y.2d at 577, 249 N.E.2d at 398-99, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 525.
61 See the remarks of Judge Burke, author of the opinion for the court in Dym,
concurring in the Tooker case. 24 N.Y.2d at 591, 249 N.E.2d at 407, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 538.
62 16 N.Y.2d at 125,209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467 (emphasis in original). The
majority also remarked: "Having accepted the benefits of [Colorado] law for such a
prolonged period, it is spurious to maintain that Colorado has no interest in a relationship
which was formed there. In Babcock the New Yorkers at all times were in transitu and we
were impressed with the fundamental unfairness of subjecting them to a law which they in
no sense had adopted." Id. at 125, 209 N.E.2d at 795, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
63 Judge Burke, in his concurring opinion, characterizes Tooker as a pure "interest
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cifically related to those rules which each concerned legal order
would apply to an analogous fully domestic situation; in Dym, the
court gave weight to a general policy of comprehensibility. Much of
Judge Breitel's dissenting opinion in Tooker can be viewed as
asserting that comprehensibility is a significant policy and that the
result reached by the majority is simply not understandable to
laymen. 64 Outright dismissal of comprehensibility as a policy to be
considered in handling multistate problems would be most difficult
to justify. On the other hand, often it will not be easy to determine
whether a given result is incomprehensible or, if so, to decide what
consequences follow for the given case. Perhaps the policy of
comprehensibility standing alone should not change a result that is
supported by strong countervailing policy considerations. The situ-
ation may well be different, however, where to incomprehensibility
is added the conclusion that the result is either in itself invidious or
likely to require invidious distinctions in related cases.
The result reached in Dym does not represent an invidious
distinction as compared with Babcock unless either distinction based
on the relationship's seat is incomprehensible or comprehensibility
is considered an inadequate basis for distinguishing between two
roughly similar situations. If Dym and Babcock were both correctly
decided, related cases can, at least for the most part, be disposed of
without encountering objections either of incomprehensibility or
invidiousness. Cases of Ontario guests, invited by New York hosts in
New York, and injured in an accident in either New York or
Ontario, represent the situations most productive of difficulty when
Dym is taken as correctly decided. At least in the second case, so far
as New York's policies are concerned, the basis for permitting
recovery is less substantial than in Babcock. Furthermore, to the
extent that Ontario disapproves of ungrateful gnests, in both cases
the basis in Ontario policy for denying recovery is more substantial.
However, where the relationship had its seat in New York and the
accident occurred there, denial of relief, even if comprehensible,
may seem invidious since the guest's personal law would be consid-
ered decisive. The situation is less clear where the accident occurs
in Ontario. Such comprehensibility as flows from the seat of the
relationship here wars with that which flows from one's personal law
and the place of the accident. It would seem, therefore, that in the
analysis approach" to choice-of-law problems. 24 N.Y.2d at 591, 249 N.E.2d at 408, 301
N.Y.S.2d at 538.
" See especially id. at 593,249 N.E.2d at 409, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 540, quoted in conjunction
with note 46 supra.
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second case neither permitting nor denying recovery would violate
appropriate standards of comprehensibility nor involve an offensive
discrimination. A final case, that of an Ontario resident, invited in
Ontario by a New York driver and injured in Ontario, presents no
difficulty from the perspective of comprehensibility or invidiousness
if the Dym rule is taken to be correct.
Far more serious problems of comprehensibility and invidious
discrimination arise in these situations once Tooker supplants Dym.
If the New York guest can recover from the New York host even
though the relationship's seat is in Ontario and the accident
occurred in Ontario, how should the Ontario guest be treated in an
otherwise comparable situation? From the perspective of the
policies underlying New York's domestic rules, clearly the Ontario
guest's claim is less strong than the New York guest's was in Tooker.
On the other hand, one of the policies presumably underlying
Ontario's guest statute-the protection of insurance companies and
their policy holders-does not reach the situation. Consequently, it
is not clear that both legal orders, consulting only the policies
underlying their domestic-law rules, would wish to bar recovery.
The canon of comprehensibility is satisfied by applying the guest
statute; the guest is from Ontario, and the accident occurred there.
Yet, once Tooker is in the books, lay thinking may well consider the
result invidious; if territorial considerations were not decisive for
the New York plaintiff in Tooker why should they control in the
case of an Ontario plaintiff?
The suggested difficulty did not deter the New York Court of
Appeals from denying in these circumstances recovery to the
Ontario guest in Neumeier v. Kuehner.65 The one dissenter in
Neumeier, Judge Bergan, argued, however, that according different
treatment on the basis of the guest's personal law results in an
offensive discrimination:
There is a difference of fundamental character between
justifying a departure from lex loci delictus because the court will
not, as a matter of policy, permit a New York owner of a car
licensed and insured in New York to escape a liability that would
be imposed on him here; and a departure based on the fact a
New York resident makes the claim for injury. The first ground
of departure is justifiable as sound policy; the second is
justifiable only if one is willing to treat the rights of a stranger
permitted to sue in New York differently from the way a resi-
dent is treated. Neither because of "interest" nor "contact" nor
any other defensible ground is it proper to say in a court of law
65 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972) (6-1 decision).
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that the rights of one man whose suit is accepted shall be
adjudged differently on the merits on the basis of where he
happens to live. 66
Judge Bergan concluded with the observation that the result
reached in Neumeier involves "an inadmissible distinction."
67
Our analysis of Babcock and its progeny thus suggests that at a
certain point policy-based analyses face an unpleasant dilemma
that arises from the impossibility of resolving the choice-of-law
problem in terms of the specific policies underlying the rules whose
applicability is in question without seriously compromising com-
prehensibility and a policy against invidious distinctions. Con-
versely, as Dym makes dear, policies of comprehensibility and
noninvidiousness can only be advanced at the expense of the
specific policies underlying domestic-law rules. Babcock was an easy
case to decide, as it did not involve this dilemma. Dym, Tooker, and
Neumeier all present the dilemma, however. Our analysis of the
cases thus suggests that the results reached i.n such multistate
situations cannot be entirely satisfying.
IV
CAVERS'S CHOICE-OF-LAW THEORY
Surprisingly little scholarly attention has been devoted to the
problem of principled, comprehensible, and noninvidious solutions
to choice-of-law questions. Leflar has the issue generally in mind
when he writes that
Governmental interest is too large a notion to be narrowly
defined or rigidly confined. It must include all the relevant
concerns that the particular government, not only as a sovereign
entity but also as a repository ofjustice, may have in a set of facts
or an issue. 68
However, his analysis in terms of five "choice-influencing consider-
ations" (predictabililty of results, maintenance of interstate and
international order, simplification of the judicial task, advancement
of the forum's governmental interests, and application of the better
rule of law69 ) adds little toward solving the dilemma under discus-
sion. An approach in terms of "the better rule of law" probably
complicates the problem even further, unless general agreement
66 Id. at 132-33, 286 N.E.2d at 460, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 74.
67 Id at 134, 286 N.E.2d at 461, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 75.
68 R. LELAR, supra note 34, § 109, at 252.
69 See id. § 105, at 245.
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were to exist on the standards by which superiority was to be
judged.7 0
By all odds, the most sustained and comprehensive attempt in
American conflicts literature to deal with certain aspects of the
dilemma facing choice-of-law theory and practice is the recent
writing of Cavers. His effort to provide principled bases for deter-
mining which legal order's position should prevail when analysis of
a multistate situation reveals conflicting views began in 1965 with
publication of The Choice-of-Law Process. He has since pursued the
same theme in other publications. 71 He notes that
the factors [analyzed in a policy-based approach] often point in
different directions and carry in themselves no measures of their
significance. To me... the policy factors will ordinarily be by all
odds the most consequential, yet, where they conflict, the choice
between them becomes one that inevitably represents the expres-
sion of a preference. But should not that preference be both
articulate and principled?72
As a basis for such principles, he proposes that the required value
judgments should be made
[f]rom the point of view of any forum-the more interested the
better-which undertakes to propose, and to adhere to, a princi-
ple of preference in the hope, but not on the condition, that it
will provide a mutually acceptable scheme of accommodation for
laws of the same general type as are involved in the case before
it. 7
3
A later formulation takes the following form: the principle is
not unlike that propounded by Savigny and cast in aphoristic
terms by De Nova who remarks its "Kantian flavour": the test of
the appropriateness of a conflicts rule is "whether [the] suggested
rule really deserves to be included in a law common to all
nations. '74
70 Cf. Cavers, The Value of Principled Preferences, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 211, 213 (1971). In a
recent article Leflar seems to view the "better rule" criterion as a guide to-rather than
for-judicial practice in the choice-of-law field. See Leflar, The "New" Choice of Law, 21 AM.
U.L. REV. 457, 474 (1972). It is interesting to note that a number of courts have found the
"better rule" test attractive. E.g., Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); see also
Cavers, supra, at 213-15.
71 See especially Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law In American Perspective, in ACADiMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE, 1970-III RECuEIL DES COURS 74 [hereinafter cited as
CONTEMPORARY CONFlICrs LAW]; Cavers, supra note 70.
72 CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS LAW 145-46.
73 D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 132 (1965) [hereinafter cited as CHOICE-
OF-LAw PROCESS].
74 CoNrEMPORARY CONFUICTS LAw 153. In developing his theory, Cavers found sugges-
tive the writings of the Harvard philosopher John Rawls whose views have since been
developed more fully in J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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Utilizing this approach, Cavers developed, in the context of
tort and contract law and by way of example, six principles of
preference.7 5 Four relate to delictual liability:
1. Where the liability laws of the state of injury set a higher
standard of conduct or of financial protection against injury than
do the laws of the state where the person causing the injury has
acted or had his home, the laws of the state of injury should
determine the standard and the protection applicable to the case,
at least where the person injured was not so related to the person
causing the injury that the question should be relegated to the
law governing their relationship.7 6
2. [Conversely, where the state in which the defendant acted
and caused an injury sets lower standards than does the home state
of the victim, the former controls,] at least where the person
injured was not so related to the person causing the injury that
the question should be relegated to the law governing the rela-
tionship.77
3. Where the state in which a defendant acted has estab-
lished special controls, including the sanction of civil liability,
over conduct of the kind in which the defendant was engaged
when he caused a foreseeable injury to the plaintiff in another
state, the plaintiff, though having no relationship to defendant,
should be accorded the benefit of the special standards of con-
duct and of financial protection in the state of the defendant's
conduct, even though the state of injury had imposed no such
controls or sanctions.78
4. Where the law of a state in which a relationship has its
seat has imposed a standard of conduct or of financial protection
on one party to that relationship for the benefit of the other
party which is higher than the like standard imposed by the state
of injury, the law of the former state should determine the
standard of conduct or of financial protection applicable to the
case for the benefit of the party protected by that state's law.7 9
The two remaining examples are developed in contract set-
tings:
5. Where, for the purpose of providing protection from the
adverse consequences of incompetence, heedlessness, ignorance,
or unequal bargaining power, the law of a state has imposed
restrictions on the power to contract or to convey or encumber
71 Cavers suggests-only to reject-a seventh principle, applicable to delictual liability.
See CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 177-80. The rejected principle is the converse of the fourth
principle.
71 Id. at 139 (emphasis in original). The qualification does not become operative simply
upon proof of a relationship. The relationship must be one which, under the circumstances,
justifies the application of the personal law.
77 CHoicE-oF-LAw PROCESS 146.
78 Id. at 159.
79 Id. at 166 (emphasis in original).
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property, its protective provisions should be applied against a
party to the restricted transaction where (a) the person protected
has a home in the state (if the law's purpose were to protect the
person) and (b) the affected transaction or protected property
interest were centered there or, (c) if it were not, this was due to
facts that were fortuitous or had been manipulated to evade the
protective law.80
6. If the express (or reasonably inferable) intention of the
parties to a transaction involving two or more states is that the
law of a particular state which is reasonably related to the
transaction should be applied to it, the law of that state should be
applied if it allows the transaction to be carried out, even though
neither party has a home in the state and the..transaction is not
centered there. However, this principle does not apply if the
transaction runs counter to any protective law that the preceding
principle would render applicable or if the transaction includes a
conveyance of land and the mode of conveyance or the interests
created run counter to applicable mandatory rules of the situs of
the land. This principle does not govern the legal effect of the
transaction on third parties with independent interests.8 1
Although a full analysis of these rather intricate propositions
cannot be undertaken here, a discussion of the basic approach is
essential. s2  The principles are designed to deal with true
conflicts-situations in which analysis of the policies held by the
potentially concerned legal orders indicates that several jurisdic-
tions are indeed concerned and that they do not agree upon how a
given issue should be regnlated.8 3 Thus, Cavers addresses himself
to the question of which legal order, where substantial difficulties
arise, should ultimately control a given aspect of a multistate
situation or transaction. It must also be kept in mind "that the
failure of a case to come within the scope of a principle of
preference does not mean that the proper choice to be made must
for that reason be the reverse of the choice indicated by the
principle. '8 4 Each principle is developed and discussed in a rather
particularized context. Although general commentary is difficult,
some remarks can be ventured nevertheless.
o Id. at 181.
81 Id. at 194.
82 It should be noted that for Cavers the principles stated are only "guides for decision,
leaving ample room for independent judgment to any courts that resorted to them." Id. at
136. He also envisaged the possibility that, as distinctions were drawn in the application of
the principles, some "would be subjected to fission," and, if the process were to continue,
that a specific rule or set of rules might emerge. Id. at 137.
83 The principles can, of course, also help in deciding "whether a conflict is false or
avoidable." Cavers, .upra note 70, at 221.
84 CHOICE-oF-LAw PROcEss 189.
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Reflection on the first principle and on the supporting com-
mentary suggests several observations. In the first place, the princi-
ple seems to represent in part an assignment vis-&-vis other poten-
tially competing policies of a relatively higher value to "laws and
regulations governing conduct [designed] to provide for 'the gen-
eral security.' "85 There is further an assumption that policies
providing for the "general security" are at least as widely shared by
contemporary societies as any potentially relevant policy. 86 Al-
though the points are not discussed, it is also implied that the
principle is comprehensible to the layman and that comprehensibil-
ity is a significant policy. The principle's territorial bias serves
comprehensibility because of our innate tendency-due to the
importance of territorial organization for daily social, political, and
economic life-to think in territorial terms. Thus, a defendant
"cannot fairly claim to enjoy whatever benefits a state may offer
those who enter its bounds and at the same time claim exemption
from the burdens. '87 The significance of comprehensibility is
further suggested by the principle's possible qualification "where
the person injured was . . .so related to the person causing the
injury that the question should be relegated to the law governing
their relationship." 88
The second principle of preference does not, as Cavers points
out, rest in any large measure on the need of the location of the
action and injury to provide for the general security; that purpose
would-except where a rule's purpose was to encourage a given
form of conduct by removing or limiting the risk of attendant
liability-be at least as effectively advanced by applying the law of
another concerned jurisdiction that set higher standards. Ulti-
mately, the basis for the second principle comes down to a policy of
comprehensibility and of avoiding invidious distinctions. If con-
siderations of lay comprehensibility are left aside, a policy-based
85 Id. at 139-40.
86 The need to maintain physical and financial protection against injury-causing
conduct is not the particular concern of one or a few states or a need relating to one ora
few special laws. All states experience this need and do so with respect to all-or nearly
all-of their laws establishing standards of conduct and remedies to protect against
physical and financial hazards. Therefore, if general recognition is given to this
principle, all states will on occasion benefit by it.
Id. at 140-41.
87 Id. at 141.
If he has not entered the state but has caused harm within it by his act outside it,
then, save perhaps where the physical or legal consequences of his action were not
foreseeable, it is equally fair to hold him to the standards of the state into which he sent
whatever harmful agent, animal, object, or message caused the injury.
88 Id. at 139.
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analysis reaches, in many of the situations contemplated by the
principle, the conclusion that, if a higher degree of protection is
afforded, the laws of the parties' home states should regulate.
Indeed, the very important and influential decisions of the New
York Court of Appeals in Babcock and Tooker taken together can be
viewed as announcing this proposition, at least where the parties
have the same home state.89
Cavers's third principle rests upon the idea that rules strin-
gently regulating certain kinds of conduct, such as the selling of
liquor or blasting operations, recognize hazards that require special
care, and hence the rules have a strong admonitory function. The
regulatory policy here is thus stronger than that attaching to many
other rules of delictual liability. Further, where the conduct in
question is an economic activity, the provision of compensation for
those harmed thereby is viewed as a cost that should rest ultimately
upon the community rather than upon those injured. The reach of
rules and standards of liability in situations where costs should be
internalized is little affected by the fact that the injury materialized
or the victim had his home elsewhere. In addition, since the
operation of the market will, at least in theory, cause the economic
activity in question to internalize the cost,90 permitting recovery in
the multistate situations contemplated by the third principle does
not impose an economic burden that the defendant must bear, but
merely results in a marginally higher cost to the community for the
services in question.9 1
The fourth principle developed by Cavers is based upon the
proposition that the application of higher standards of conduct or
financial protection for the benefit of one party to a relationship,
when the standards are held by the state in which the "relationship
has its seat," is neither incomprehensible nor invidious and further
would not require invidious or incomprehensible results in related
cases. As Cavers indicates,
The relationship would provide an objective basis for differen-
s Aside from perhaps increased difficulty at the level of comprehensibility, there seems
little reason why the result should differ where the parties have different home states if
these agree on the regulation of the particular issue. Cf. Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432
P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
90 For an interesting study of how legal rules can affect the interualization of costs, see
G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
91 If market mechanisms do not operate perfectly, the result of denying recovery will be
a windfall for the defendant if his cost internalization did not distinguish between domestic
and multistate situations. Conversely, permitting recovery would impose an economic
burden upon the defendant if insufficient costs had been internalized. It can be noted that
the risk of inadequate costing is borne by the activity in fully domestic situations.
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flating the cases involving it from other cases arising within the
state of injury and thus relieve the problem of discrimination.
What the forum would be concerned with would be a special
case, one carrying with it a special justification.9 2
It can perhaps be argued that in the modern, highly mobile world,
application of the law of the seat of a relationship is indeed often
more comprehensible than application of the law of the place where
the injurious conduct occurred and the injury resulted; if so, the
comprehensibility argument affirmatively supports the fourth
principle. Cavers suggests, although without full analysis, another
argument affirmatively supporting the principle. He asserts that
legal orders generally perceive a need to regulate relationships
having their seat in the community, and continues:
[C]ould the principle I have stated reasonably be proposed for
mutual acceptance by states in a position of equal liberty? By
acceptance, each state would gain the advantage of being able to
impose more exacting legal consequences on a relationship it had
undertaken to regulate even though the parties to the relation-
ship had gone to a state that imposed less exacting consequences.
Each state, when the place of injury, would surrender the power
to apply its own lower standards of conduct or financial protec-
tion to a relationship arising in, and regulated by, another state.
... In sum, I believe the proposed preference could be advanced
for mutual aiceptance with good prospects of success.9 3
The remaining two principles of preference deal with the
fields of contract and property law. In situations where one con-
cerned jurisdiction has protective laws while another subordinates
protective policies to foster free and secure transactions, the fifth
principle renders applicable the former's law where
the person protected has a home in [that] state ... and... the
affected transaction or protected property interest were centered
there or, ... if it were not, this was due to facts that were
fortuitous or had been manipulated to evade the protective
law.9
4
The raison d'ktre of this principle appears to be that where the
parties' understandings and expectations could and should have
been shaped by the protective rules in question, the policy foster-
ing economic activity should properly yield to the protective policy.
The last principle makes decisive in many cases
ifie express (or reasonably inferable) intention of the parties...
92 CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCEsS 169-70.
93 Id. at 168, 170.
94 Id. at 181.
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that the law of a particular state which is reasonably related to
the transaction should be applied to it.... if [that law] allows the
transaction to be carried out, even though neither party has a
home in the state and the transaction is not centered there.95
The principle is justified as follows:
The widespread recognition of the autonomy of the parties
in choice of law relating to contracts and, to a lesser degree, to
other transactions, is an index of the relatively high importance
attached to certainty in these areas and the relatively low impor-
tance attached to many of the legal restraints and requirements
that might defeat the parties' expectations. 96
The ultimate basis for this principle is perhaps that the multistate
nature of a transaction attenuates the claim of any given legal
order to regulate, so that except in cases covered by the preceding
principle, a presumably shared policy of facilitating multistate
transactions makes it appropriate for all concerned jurisdictions to
accept a reasonable accommodation by the parties to the multiplic-
ity of possibly applicable rules and principles.
Having discussed in turn each of Cavers's principles of prefer-
ence, the question remains whether they imply a general approach
that avoids, at least in substantial measure, the dilemmas that tend
to arise in policy-based analyses. A first observation is that some of
Cavers's arguments in support of certain of his principles of
preference do not, strictly speaking, validate the proposed prefer-
ence but rather suggest useful refinements in the analysis of how a
concerned jurisdiction would wish to regulate the situation or
transaction. Thus, the argument advanced in support of the third
principle, that the regulatory policy behind rules governing certain
kinds of conduct (for example, the selling of liquor or blasting
operations), is siguificantly stronger than the regulatory policy
behind a general delictual rule imposing liability for negligent
conduct, although it touches an argument for preference, goes
basically to the full understanding of the policy underlying the rule
in question. Such refinement is obviously important in determining
whether a significant conflict actually exists, but does not provide a
basis for resolving true conflicts that will necessarily commend itself
to all concerned jurisdictions. The principle in question is also
95 Id. at 194.
[The] principle should be applicable to a separable part of a transaction or to a
particular rule of law relating to it .... Similarly rare but unobjectionable would be
a situation in which the parties' intention is directed to the whole law of the state
chosen by them.
Id. at 194-95.
96 Id. at 195-96.
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supported by arguments that go directly to the problem of prefer-
ence. Thus, the reciprocity argument asserts that legal orders will
desire reciprocal recognition of admonitory law. Moreover, policies
of comprehensibility and noninvidiousness support the principle.
The defendant's expectations were presumably shaped by the law
of the place of the event; costs were calculated, and insurance
arrangements were also made on that basis. Nor, in view of the
territorial connections present, would the rule be perceived as
reflecting simply the defendant's personal law.
An analysis of the principles suggests that they rest upon four
general propositions, which can in certain situations lead to agree-
ment among concerned jurisdictions that in the event of a true
conflict the views of one should prevail. The first proposition is
that, at least in certain areas, the concerned legal orders will see
mutual advantage in agreeing that policies typically subordinated
by them in domestic situations are, in the event of true conflicts,
likewise to be subordinated in multistate situations. Thus, if a legal
order consistently advances certain protection policies-protection
of married women for example-through its domestic-law rules, it
should recognize comparable policies asserted by other legal orders
in multistate situations even though the legal order in question
would not accord protection under its domestic rules in the par-
ticular fact situations.
The proposition that mutual advantage can be perceived de-
pends upon the assumption that, where policies have to be subor-
dinated, all the concerned jurisdictions, in handling domestic situa-
tions, will-speaking in general terms rather than with respect to
the precise problem that requires decision--consistently prefer to
advance certain policies at the expense of others. If this require-
ment is satisfied, Cavers believes that each legal order may perceive
mutual advantage-and act accordingly-in accepting comparable
priorities in cases of true conflicts. Each legal order gains recogni-
tion of its preferred policies at the price of subordinating its less
preferred policies when another legal order has a reasonable basis
for applying its comparable preferred policy.
There are serious difficulties with this analysis. It builds on a
model desigued to test the justice of rules proposed for a single
society: which rules would members of a society, who choose freely
but without knowledge as to how a chosen rule would affect them
personally, consider most just? In developing rules for a single
society, it is helpful to analyze a problem from the perspective of
hypothetical members of the community who are asked what
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values they are prepared to support without regard to their par-
ticular social circumstances, political power, or economic position.
Just results are seen as emerging from each being placed in a
position where the self-advantage of all must be consulted and the
highest common denominator determined. The method of analysis
presupposes that all will live by the resulting rules, not seeking
self-advantage in the particular case. A single community, by
enforcing rules and principles, makes this presupposition opera-
tive. In multistate situations, however, only the self-restraint of
each legal order and the possibility of retaliation operate to check
freeloading. Considering the range of situations and circumstances
in which this principle would be called upon to operate, it is hard
to be sanguine with regard to its effectiveness in choice-of-law
practice. Moreover, unless the overall balance of preferred policies
is the same for all the legal orders in question, some jurisdictions
will not maximize the total reach of their policies if all obey the
principle in question.
The next general proposition suggested by Cavers's principles
of preference is more persuasive. In the event of a true conflict, a
legal order should not insist on regulating the situation or transac-
tion in a way that is incomprehensible to laymen or that results in
invidious distinctions either in the given case or in closely related
ones. Thus, Cavers emphasizes territorial circumstances and the
seat of relationships. This recoguizes that justice in multistate
situations involves more than the full and accurate analysis of the
reach of the policies specifically underlying competing rules and
principles. Each multijurisdictional situation or transaction reveals
the existence of a community which, although more ad hoc and
transitory than a politically organized society, need not be viewed
as existing in a state of nature. Consequently, the various separate
legal orders involved in the situation or transaction should recog-
nize that the individuals caught up in these overarching com-
munities have a claim to treatment that they perceive as equal.
Here, one aspect of a widely held principle of justice-that of equal
treatment-is extrapolated from politically organized communities
to looser, less stable, and politically unorganized supra-state com-
munities.
The remaining two general propositions derive largely from
the fifth and sixth principles and suggest that certain policies come
into play and are mutually shared precisely because of the multi-
state nature of a transaction or a situation. Both propositions take
into account reasonable party expectations, thus avoiding difficul-
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ties at the level of comprehensibility and invidiousness. 97 The first
proposition is that the ad hoc community of normally separate
-legal orders engendered by the multistate transaction or situation
should respect strong protective policies held by one member,
where relevant in the circumstances, so long as the parties knew, or
clearly should have known, of the protective policy, and could have
conformed, without serious cost in terms of their activities gener-
ally, to the requirement in question. In terms of relations in-and
regulation of-multistate situations, a special value is thus placed
upon respecting, where feasible, protective policies. Observing
such policies under these conditions prevents a transaction that one
concerned community considers affirmatively improper from
being enforced, thereby incurring the not unreasonable cost of
foregoing, or restructuring, the transaction. Under these cir-
cumstances, slight inhibition of economic activity is a reasonable
sacrifice in order to avoid giving specific offense to a concerned
legal order by frustrating its protective policy.
The final proposition is that multistate situations and transac-
tions are not regrettable phenomena that must, at best, be toler-
ated, but are rather expressions of economic and social vitality,
beneficial in the vast majority of cases for all the legal orders
involved. Consequently, when a multistate problem arises, the ad
hoc community of legal orders that results can be taken to have a
common policy of facilitating the multistate activity. This com-
mon policy can be overcome where one legal order has a strong
countervailing policy, but only where that policy is of substantial
importance to the concerned legal order. Moreover, the degree of
substantiality required presumably varies inversely with the
difficulty of knowing and conforming to the countervailing poli-
cy.98
Cavers's principles of preference can, therefore, be viewed as
contributing to three problem areas in which policy-based choice-
of-law theory needs improvement: further refinement of the
analysis of policies specifically giving rise to rules and principles;
the issues of incomprehensibility and invidiousness; and the articu-
lation of essentially multistate policies. Obviously, much remains to
be done. Nor is there any warrant that entirely satisfying solutions
97 Comprehensibility is not merely a function of past expectations. But where the
parties have expectations and the choice-of-law rule takes these into account, the result will
rarely-if ever-be incomprehensible to the parties.
98 Two California decisions illustrate well the application in practice of this proposition:
Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal. 2d 588, 360 P.2d 906, 12 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1961); People v. One
1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
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can ultimately be found for every choice-of-law problem. Indeed,
our discussion suggests that in certain situations following the
dominant policies underlying specific substantive rules inevitably
clashes with policies of comprehensibility and noninvidiousness. In
multistate situations, the paradox is often inescapable. One must
then choose between sacrificing, with Cavers, instrumental re-
quirements of specific legal rules in order to satisfy a general sense
of justice, and advancing, as the New York-Court of Appeals did in
Tooker and in Neumeier, policies underlying specific rules at some
expense to the general sense of fairness.
V
THE RESTATEMENT SECOND
Before concluding our analysis of contemporary American
theory and practice, a few observations must be made respecting
the recently published Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.99 The
new Restatement reflects contemporary trends and cross currents
respecting choice of law. The dispositive rules of the first Restate-
ment,100 derived from a vested-rights analysis, are supplanted by
the broad proposition that the law of the state having the most
significant relationship to the issue presented shall govern and by
guidelines to assist in interpreting and applying the concept of
most significant relationship. Thus section 145 provides the follow-
ing "General Principle" for choice of law in the field of delicts:
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an
issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles
of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the
parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.
Section 6, which is incorporated by reference in many of the
Restatement's choice-of-law provisions, reads as follows:
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICr OF LAwS (1971). The Reporter for this impor-
tant reworking of contemporary American theory and practice was Professor Willis L. M.
Reese of Columbia University Law School.
100 See note 5 supra.
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(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a
statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.
The new Restatement thus provides "basic norms consist[ing] of
standards . . . largely open-ended in their content . . . ."101 The
approach is ample enough to encompass a highly developed
policy-based analysis. However, the Restatement does not sig-
nificantly refine and discipline theory and analysis. No principled
basis is adumbrated, for example, in terms of which clashes be-
tween policies underlying specific domestic-law rules and more
general policies of comprehensibility or of facilitation of multistate
activity can be resolved. The need for additional guidance is felt,
but what is offered takes the somewhat evasive form of "a secon-
dary statement in black letter setting forth the choice of law the
courts will 'usually' make in given situations.' 01 °2 By and large, the
new Restatement is a monument to the fundamental changes that
have in the last decades taken place in American thinking regard-
ing the choice-of-law problem. It does not, however, resolve the
difficulties and tensions that policy-based approaches encounter.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis of contemporary American theory and
practice is most incomplete.10 3 Important treatises are not consid-
ered.10 4 Relatively few decisions are analyzed, and discussion
101 Wechsler, Introduction to 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS at viii
(1971).
102 Id.
103 For a recent and more complete survey, see CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS LAW 75; R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-7 (1971).
104 Brief reference has been made to R. LEFLAR, supra note 34. Other important works
include A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962) and PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE TREATISE ON AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS
LAW, INCLUDING THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1967). Ehrenzweig, a harsh critic of the Restate-
ment's approach to choice-of-law problems, was a provocative and prolific writer in this field.
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focuses for the most part on choice of law for the field of delicts. 1°5
The problems that must be considered in any attempt to evaluate
the contemporary American choice-of-law scene are simply so vast
and difficult that one must seek to grasp the outlines and direction
of the whole by considering some fragments of the total scene.
Nonetheless, the discussion undertaken affords a basis for reflec-
tion and generalization.
This analysis has sought to demonstrate the inherent complex-
ity of policy-based approaches to choice of law and to suggest some
of the areas that are likely in the years ahead to command the
attention of jurists utilizing an instrumental methodology. One
type of juristic effort, not considered in the foregoing discussion,
that is likely to assume increasing importance is the development of
choice-of-law rules. In the administration of justice, rules are
psychologically attractive and of considerable practical advantage.
Inevitably, a radical shift in methodology involves, as the new
Restatement so well illustrates, a discarding of old rules before new
ones have had time to emerge. Moreover, the process of develop-
ing rules is particularly difficult where they are to reflect an
instrumental analysis of varied and complex policy mixes such as
are often encountered in multistate situations. Consequently, it is
understandable that today instrumental analyses typically provide a
statement of method and of factors to be considered rather than a
dispositive statement of results. There remains what Willis Reese
has called the "principal question in choice of law today . . .
whether we should [and can] have rules .... -106 Policy-based
approaches are not antagonistic to rules, in principle, although the
required analysis reveals sharply the difficulties that may be in-
volved in generalizing results in the form of rules. Indeed, the
drive toward rule-making is already seen in the three principles
that Judge Fuld adumbrated in his concurring opinion in Tooker
for guest-statute cases, 107 and in the efforts of Cavers to develop
principles of preference.
105 The emphasis on these problems is due in considerable measure- to the central
position they have occupied in scholarly commentary and in judicial efforts to break new
ground.
106 Reese, supra note 38.'
107 24 N.Y.2d at 585, 249 N.E.2d at 404, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 532-33. Judge Fuld's
principles are:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same
state, and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and
determine the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that
state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by
reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of
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Choice-of-law rules deriving from an instrumental analysis
will, with some exceptions, be more complex and less dispositive
than the rules to which we are accustomed in domestic law. Rules
for domestic-law situations assume, for the most part, a stable mix
of policy; consequently, the dispositive formula need not be con-
ditioned upon the presence of particular policy ingredients.
A comparable assumption of stability cannot be made for
multistate situations; therefore, as is seen in Fuld's, Cavers's, and
the Restatement Second's formulations, decisive variations in policy
have to be recognized in any attempt to state dispositive proposi-
tions. Choice-of-law rules will not only be more complex than their
domestic counterparts; they are also likely to emerge more slowly,
at least when they are formulated judicially. Judicial experience
with any given choice-of-law problem is usually more episodic than
with analogous domestic-law problems and, as a far greater variety
of policy mixes will normally require consideration, greater experi-
ence in dealing with a given multistate situation is required before
one can proceed on a firm basis. Choice-of-law rules will also
typically be narrower in scope than the domestic-law rules.
Moreover, for reasons noted above, it will often be impossible to
state a proposition in a way that does not directly take into account
which of several possible policy mixes is encountered in the given
case. Subject to these qualifications, the results reached through
policy-based analysis should be susceptible of generalization in a
dispositive manner, that is to say, of statement as rules.
Choice-of-law problems, when fully understood, are inherently
more complex than their domestic-law analogues. A greater
number and variety of policies must be considered. Some of these
are wholly or largely unique to multistate situations, so that there is
little or no domestic learning or experience on which to draw.
These complications should gradually yield to reflection and ex-
perience. However, an ultimate source of complexity in choice of
the state of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the
state of his own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into
that state should not-in the absence of special circumstances--be permitted to
interpose the law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in
different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule
of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be
shown that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant
substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Id.
In the recent case of Neumeier v. Kuehner, discussed in text accompanying notes 65-67
supra, Judge Fuld quoted the above passage and applied the third principle. See 31 N.Y.2d at
128-29, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70-71.
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law will remain: justice must be administered for ad hoc com-
munities having common elements of social and economic life, but
lacking a legislator and an adjudicator who are responsible to, and
speak for, the community as a whole. No one can authoritatively
resolve conflicts in values and purposes for the entire ad hoc
community; justice is in the hands of authorities whose first loyalty
and basic understanding do not run to the whole community. Yet
since that community is an economic and social reality, its unitary
claims also influence legislators and adjudicators.
Severe practical and philosophical difficulties arise from the
resulting tension between the perspective of the politically or-
ganized society from which the legislator or adjudicator derives
legal authority and that of the larger social or economic community
in the context of which the multistate problems arise. Under these
circumstances a given result may be unreasonable on occasion,
either from the perspective of the ad hoc community or of the
politically organized society. For the same reasons, the total body of
rules and principles will typically contain elements some of which
are incoherent from one, and some from another, perspective.
Moreover, those subject to the resulting legal rules will occasionally
experience a sense of injustice because of the related phenomenon
of viewing the multistate problem from perspectives other than
that taken by the legislator or adjudicator. For these reasons,
among others, choice-or-law problems insistently raise the issue of
whether and how justice can be fairly administered where social
and economic intercourse do not flow within legal units but over
and beyond them, creating ad hoc economic and social entities
larger than any single politically organized society.
Policy-based analyses have made us aware, perhaps painfully
so, of the true complexity and difficulty of the choice-of-law
problem. Particularly during the last several decades, an enormous
effort has been made by American jurists to understand the
problem fully and to meet, rather than to conceal, its difficulties.
These issues will continue to command attention; easy solutions
that ignore the realities of complex problems are no longer accept-
able.10 8 Fortunately, in a large number of multistate situations,
108 In this connection, it is interesting to note the influence of policy-based analyses on
the formulation of conflicts rules in the Draft Convention on the Law Applicable to Products
Liability, adopted by the Twelfth Session of the Hague Conference of Private International
Law. See CONfARENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE, AcrES -r DOCUMENTS DE
LA DotuzI.ME SESSION, TOME III, RESPONSIBILUT nu FAIT DES PRODUrTS, Acte final, 246-50
(1974). See also Lorenz, Der Haager Konventionsentwarf fiber das auf die Produktenhaftpflicht an-
wendbareRecht, 37 RABELS ZErrSCHRiFr FUR AUSLANDISCHES UND INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT
[RABELSZ] 317 (1973).
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policy-based analyses yield solutions that do not involve significant
complexities or ambiguities. Where real difficulties are encoun-
tered, the effort to achieve satisfying solutions must continue.
Here, attention may increasingly be given to innovative approaches
such as Cavers's proposed principles of preference and the possibil-
ity of regulating certain multistate situations under rules that do
not flow directly from the domestic law of any concerned jurisdic-
tion.10 9
The Convention provides that "the internal law of the State of the place of injury"
applies if that State is also "(a) the place of the habitual residence of the person directly
suffering damage, or (b) the principal place of business of the person claimed to be liahle, or
(c) the place where the product was acquired by the person directly suffering damage." Art.
4. However, if either relating element (b) or (c) coincides with relating element (a), "the
internal law of the State of the habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage" is
applicable. Art. 5. When neither article 4 nor 5 applies, "the applicable law shall be the
internal law of the State of the principal place of husiness of the person claimed to be liable,
unless the claimant bases his claim upon the internal law of the place of injury." Art. 6.
However, "[n]either the law of the State of the place of injury nor the law of the State of the
habitual residence of the person directly suffering damage shall be applicable by virtue of
Articles 4, 5 and 6 if the person claimed to be liable establishes that hie could not reasonably
have foreseen that the product or his own products of the same type would be made
available in that State through commercial channels." Art. 7.
109 For a discussion of this latter approach, see von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for
Multistate Problems: Their Role and Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88
HARV. L. REv. 347 (1974).
